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Notes
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN AVIATION ACCIDENT
LITIGATION: THE COMMON LAW AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Litigation arising from general and private aviation accidents
is continually increasing,' and this expansion has been accompanied
by a corresponding increase in the use of expert witnesses to aid in
understanding various complex aspects of air crashes. Experts are
utilized in the pretrial stages, for example, to assist attorneys in
understanding the accident in order to prepare a better case." Dur-
ing the trial the expert's superior knowledge is used to aid the fact
finder in deciding liability and damages.
To employ the expert effectively in the presentation of a scien-
tifically accurate, yet understandable case it is essential to have a
comprehension of the common law rules concerning the use of
expert opinion. The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, however,
will make some important changes in the rules surrounding expert
opinion. Congressional approval of the proposed rules seems prob-
able and the rules are already persuasive authority in the federal
courts. Thus, an analysis of the proposed rules will aid the trial
attorney in the effective use of experts
1 Kennelly, Aviation Accident Case, 15 TIAL LAWYERS GuiDE 281, 283
(1971).
22 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW S 24.03, at 95 (1963).
' The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence are set forth at 41 U.S.L.W. 4021
(1972) and at 56 F.R.D. 183.
The proposed rules were submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court for
congressional approval on Feb. 5, 1973. On April 3, 1973, the President signed
the House version of S. 583, which provides the Rules of Evidence "shall have
no force or effect except to the extent and with such amendments, as they may
be expressly approved by Act of Congress."
Critics of the proposed rules, including Justice William 0. Douglas, have
held the Supreme Court exceeded its authority in promulgating the rules. See
31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 679 (1973).
More specific criticisms have centered around the "privilege" issue concerning
protection under the law extended to communications between priest and pa-
rishioner, lawyer and client, and husband and wife. See 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REp. 613 (1973). For a good discussion of the Supreme Court's authority in
this area, see Comment, Congressional Discretion in Dealing With the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 6 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 798 (1973).
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Any analysis of the use of experts at common law and under
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence should explore the ap-
propriate instances in which an expert may be utilized and the re-
quirements for eliciting the desired testimony. It is accepted at
common law that an expert witness may be used as an aid to the
fact finder in determining liability in an aviation accident case.
Experts have recently been used to help determine damages, but
there is disagreement concerning what role the expert should play
in the jury's assessment of damages.
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence will help to settle this
disagreement and to allow more freedom in the use of experts in
determining damages. In addition, the proposed rules will have a
significant impact on the procedural rules surrounding the use of
experts. The most important changes the new rules will make re-
garding expert witnesses are in the procedural area regarding opin-
ions on "ultimate issues," prior disclosure of underlying facts be-
fore stating an opinion, and the hypothetical question. These pro-
visions of the rules and others will be of great practical importance
to the aviation accident litigator.
I. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
A prerequisite for the use of expert testimony at common law is
that the subject about which the expert testifies must be outside the
Federal cases which have relied upon or discussed the proposed rules con-
cerning expert opinion are: United States v. Atkins, 473 F.2d 308 (8th Cir.
1973) (relying upon proposed Rule 702); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d
1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1971) (relying upon proposed Rule 703); Bosse v. Ideco
Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., 412 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing proposed
Rule 704); Twin City Plaza, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 409 F.2d 1195
(8th Cir. 1969) (citing proposed Rule 705).
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 12, 1973
which proposed substantially the same Rules of Evidence as the Supreme Court
had proposed. H.R. Res. 5463, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Conflicting amendments by both the House and Senate made necessary the
appointment of a conference committee. The amendments of both houses of
Congress had no effect on the expert witness rules as proposed by the Supreme
Court.
[The Federal Rules of Evidence were passed and enacted into law on Jan-
uary 2, 1975 (Pub. L. No. 93-595). The final version is substantially the same
with respect to expert testimony' as the Supreme Court draft. The effective date
will be July 1, 1975. Because of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the author's discussion of their impact is especially timely and significant-EDS.]
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common knowledge of the jury.' The fact finder in aviation acci-
dent cases is often presented with issues requiring specialized skill
or knowledge to understand. In such cases, the courts have been
uniform in allowing expert testimony on the issues.' Because the
interpretation of facts arising in such a case is beyond the com-
prehension of the average juror, absent expert assistance, testimony
of one possessing special skill or knowledge is permissible.'
In testifying at trial the expert is allowed to draw inferences
from facts and to give his opinions based upon these facts.! This is
an exception to the general rule that does not allow a witness to
give his opinion of the facts in the case." The expert opinion ex-
ception has been called one based on necessity
4 Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31 (1962); Frase v. Henry, 444
F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1971); Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382 (6th Cir.
1966); Comm'r of Anne Arundel County v. State, 107 Md. 210, 68 A. 602 (Ct.
App. 1908).
5Bratt v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 155 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 735 (1946); cf. Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 216
A.2d 281 (Del. 1966); Hill v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 186 Wash. 167,
57 P.2d 405 (1936).
'See cases cited note 5 supra; see also 31 AM. JuR. 2d Expert and Opinion
Evidence § 16 (1967).
7Bratt v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 155 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. de-
nied, 329 U.S. 735 (1946); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Edwards, 361 P.2d
459 (Okla. 1961).
'See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 618
(1884); Girson v. United States, 88 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 697 (1937); Spokane & I.E.R.R. v. United States, 210 F. 243 (9th Cir.
1914), aff'd, 241 U.S. 344 (1915); Alaga Coach Line v. McCarroll, 227 Ala. 686,
151 So. 834 (1933). The foregoing authorities support the common-law proposi-
tion that a non-expert witness may testify only to the facts within his knowledge
and may not state his opinion based on these facts. Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 701 departs from this proposition and allows opinion testimony by lay
witnesses. Rule 701 states:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue.
The limitations on lay opinions are that they must be based on first-hand knowl-
edge and must be helpful to the fact-finder. The proposed rule's purpose is to
eliminate the controversy which often arises over what is "fact" and what is
"opinion." See C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)
and 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1919 (3d ed. 1940). The approach taken by
proposed Rule 701 is the rule in several state jurisdictions. See CAL. EviD. CODE
§ 800 (West 1966); KAN. CODE CIV. P. S 60-456(a) (1964); N.J. EVID. RULE
56(1) (Supp. 1974).
'See 31 AM. JUR. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 16 (1967). Wigmore
stated in regard to the test for receiving expert opinion:
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The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence do not require neces-
sity before expert testimony may be admitted. Proposed rule 702
is phrased in terms of whether the opinion of the expert will be
helpful to the fact finder.'" This is a more liberal provision for
allowing expert testimony. Proposed rule 702 will not, however,
greatly change the frequency with which experts are utilized in
aviation accident litigation in determining liability since the courts
have generally recognized that the issues involved in an aviation
accident are not normally within the common knowledge of the
jury. For this reason, expert opinion regarding liability has been
freely admitted and proposed rule 702 will not increase the fre-
quency with which experts are used.
At common law the trial court has broad discretion in deter-
mining when there exists a necessity for expert opinion. Appellate
courts are reluctant to interfere with the trial court's determination
absent a clear abuse of discretion.'1 Under proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 the trial court will presumably have the same dis-
cretion to determine when an expert opinion will be helpful to the
fact finder." The standard of review of the trial court's determina-
tion at common law will probably serve as the standard of review
under the federal rule, and reversals for an abuse of discretion un-
der the proposed rule will probably be rare.
But the only true criterion is:
On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable
help? In other words, the test is a relative one, depending upon the
particular subject and the particular witness with reference to that
subject, and is not fixed or limited to any class of persons acting
professionally.
7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923 (3d ed. 1940). See United States v. Jackson,
425 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1960); United States v. Augustine, 189 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1951).
10Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
"Marean v. Petersen, 259 Iowa 557, 144 N.W.2d 906 (1966); Lead v. Inch,
116 Minn. 467, 134 N.W. 218 (1912); Tuck v. Buller, 311 P.2d 212 (Okla.
1957).
" C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at n.67 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
NOTES
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY FOR ASSESSING DAMAGES AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER THE PROPOSED RULES
A discussion of the use of expert witnesses in determining dam-
ages should begin with an analysis of wrongful death statutes. Prior
to the enactment in 1846 of Lord Campbell's Act, the decedent's
survivors had no cause of action against the tortfeasor. " The tort
was said to die with the decedent. Because of the harshness of this
doctrine to the survivors, who may have lost valuable services of
the decedent, Lord Campbell's Act created a new cause of action
in favor of the decedent's designated personal representative."
Every American state has one of two types of statutory reme-
dies for wrongful death. The majority have enacted "death acts"
similar to Lord Campbell's Act. A minority of the states has "sur-
vival acts" which theoretically preserve the decedent's cause of ac-
tion and also provide for damages accruing to the survivors as a
result of his death.'
The damages recoverable under survival acts which combine the
decedent's cause of action and the damages resulting from his
death typically include pain and suffering, medical expenses, loss
of earnings during the decedent's lifetime, and loss to the survivors
of the future earnings of the decedent." The pain and suffering ele-
ment of damages under the survival statute may be proven by the
use of medical experts at trial. The medical expert may state his
opinion on the cause of death and at what time death occurred.
Defendant's attorney may seek to establish that the death was in-
stantaneous and that the pain and suffering was not prolonged.
The medical expert can be useful and is sometimes essential to
prove this aspect of the damages. 8
In the other major type of statute from wrongful death, the so-
139 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
14W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 127, at 901-02 (4th ed.
1971); Baker v. Bolten, 1 Comp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808), holding that
the infliction of death was not a tort against either the survivor or the decedent.
15 W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 902.
16 Id. Some states have both types of statutory schemes. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 14, at 906. A good survey of the wrongful death and survival statutes
in the various states is found in S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
App. A, at 788-904 (which lists the text of the individual state statutes).
'
7 W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 905.
'SSee 8 AM. JUR. 2d Trials § 249 (1965); J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY
§ 269, at 608 (1972).
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called "death acts," which give the decedent's survivors a cause
of action in themselves for loss of the decedent's services, the
statutory language often limits the damages to pecuniary loss to
the surviving beneficiaries.'" While this may have been intended to
include only monetary loss to the survivors, some courts have ex-
panded the concept of pecuniary loss to include loss of society,
care and attention."
Loss of the mother's care in the form of attention given to the
children's physical, moral and educational welfare may be consid-
ered in some states."1 Also considered are the husband's damages
resulting from the wife's lost services." Some states even allow com-
pensation to the survivors for the mental grief and anguish the
survivors have suffered. " Of course the basis of the damages
awarded in any wrongful death or survival action depends upon
the wording of the particular statute and the state court's interpre-
tation of that statute.u
An expert witness may be invaluable in establishing an element
of damages allowed under a particular statute. While the measure
of damages in an aircrash suit is left to the good judgment and
common sense of the jury, much guidance may be given by experts.
For example, experts may be utilized to establish the probable dur-
ation of human life, a factor directly related to the lost earnings of
19W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 907; 22 AM. JuR. 2d Death § 119 (1965).
For an example of such a statute, see N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
5-4.3 (McKinney 1967). See Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382
(1951); Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946); Gaydos v.
Domaby, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930).
20 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1952); Gardner
v. Hobbs, 69 Idaho 288, 206 P.2d 539 (1949); Gulf Transp. Co. v. Allen, 209
Miss. 206, 46 So. 2d 436 (1950); Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d
605 (1967).
21 Merrill v. United Air Lines, 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Williams
v. McDowell, 32 Cal. App. 2d 49, 89 P.2d 155 (1939); Dahl v. North American
Creameries, 61 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1953); Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244
P.2d 598 (1952).
2 2 Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Ore. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952).
23See Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971) (holding that
under the Washington wrongful death statute, damages for parental mental
anguish surrounding the death of a child were recoverable and that such dam-
ages could be proven by psychiatric testimony). See Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md.
App. 80, 305 A.2d 166 (1973) (allowed parental mental anguish as an element
of damages based upon a statutory provision).
24For a comparison of the statutes and the type of damages allowed under
each one, see S. SPEISER, supra note 16.
the decedent. While mortality tables are frequently used, the ex-
pert may show why the decedent would have lived longer or short-
er than the norm.
In Krohmer v. Dahl,' a recent Montana case, the court reason-
ed that use of a statistician gave the jury a reasonable basis upon
which to estimate the probable future earnings of the decedent,
and dismissed defendant's contention that the testimony was spec-
ulative."6 The probable duration of human life may be established
by an expert actuary, economist or physician27 and there is an in-
creasing awareness of the need for such experts to assist the jury
in predicting loss of future earnings capacity. 8 Proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 would allow use of experts of this type in
predicting loss of future earnings. But because the common law
recognizes the need for expert testimony for this purpose the use
of the expert in assessing loss of earnings should not appreciably
increase.
In addition to the loss of earnings to the survivors, some statutes
and courts have allowed compensation for loss of society, care and
attention.29 One interesting development is the "substitute mother-
housewife" concept. While the economic loss of an employed moth-
er-housewife may be easily estimated, the loss to the survivors of
their unemployed mother or wife is not so easily established. Some
courts now allow the value of the substitute services of a mother-
housewife to be estimated through the testimony of experts."
The substitute mother-housewife concept provides a good back-
ground for the analysis of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
702." It has been suggested that the value of a mother's service is
clearly within the common knowledge of a jury and therefore
25 145 Mont. 491, 402 P.2d 979 (1965); see also Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E.
Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833, reh. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 937 (1956).
26 145 Mont. at -, 402 P.2d at 982.
2 7 See J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 240, at 506-07 (1972); Kansas
City Southern Ry. v. Morris, 80 Ark. 528, 98 S.W. 363 (1906); Francis v. Sauve,
222 Cal. App. 2d 102, 34 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); Scott v. James Gibbons Co.,
192 Md. 319, 64 A.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1949).
21S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3:18, at 120 (1966).
29 See note 20 supra.
3°Har-Pen Truck Lines v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967); Smith v.
Whidden, 87 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1956); Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, 170 N.W.2d
632 (Iowa 1969).
3 See note 10 supra.
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expert opinion on this issue should be excluded. 2 This view has
been adopted by at least one state court." Other courts which have
considered the issue have recognized that an expert's guidance may
be helpful, if not necessary, for the jury to reach an intelligent de-
cision on this element of damage.' Proposed rule 702, couched
in terms of allowing expert testimony if it will be helpful, should
cause more courts to admit testimony on the value of a mother's
services to her survivors.
A federal court approved the use of experts to assess the value
of a decedent mother's services to her surviving children in Merrill
v. United Air Lines, Inc."5 In that case, an action was brought in
federal court on behalf of two young children who had lost their
mother in an aviation accident. To demonstrate the pecuniary loss
to the children, plaintiff called a professional home economist as
an expert to testify to the nature of the services ordinarily per-
formed by a young mother and the cost of replacing these services
by supplying a "substitute mother." The defendant objected to
this testimony on the ground that the value of a mother's services
was within the common knowledge of the jury and thus not a prop-
er subject of expert opinion."6 The trial judge in admitting this
testimony, stated:
Popular knowledge and common sense may be and indeed are val-
uable. But they are not the sole recourse. The fact that parents
from time immemorial have taken care of their children does not es-
tablish that the views of a professional home economist may not be
sounder than those of untrained laymen in determining the cost
of those elements that go into the home in order to provide the
children with so-called "substitute mother" care.
As knowledge becomes more professionalized, specialists will
more frequently be called upon as expert witnesses. This is a
"
2See Har-Pen Truck Lines v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 1967);
Merrill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In
both cases the court rejected defendant's argument that the value of a mother's
services was an improper subject for expert opinion.
35Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 584, 262 N.Y.S.2d
854 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified, 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st
Dept. 1966).
SSee note 30 supra.
177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 288 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1961).
36 177 F. Supp. at 705.
NOTES
judicial by-product of an age of pervasive technology and expand-
ing social sciences."7
A state court decision representing the view that expert testi-
mony on the value of a mother's services should not be permitted is
Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc.8 The Zaninovich case was
a wrongful death action brought in a New York court on behalf of
four children whose parents had been killed in an aviation acci-
dent. The trial court allowed expert testimony concerning both the
father's future earnings and the costs of providing a substitute for
the mother. In reviewing the case, the appellate division stated:
[T]he court was correct in allowing business expert testimony as to
the husband's future prospects in the fruit and produce business.
These are not matters in the general knowledge of the jurors, or
for that matter, the court. . . . So long as one is entitled to re-
cover for loss of future potentialities, such evidence is permissi-
ble. On the other hand, it was error to allow proof as to the costs
of providing a substitute for the wife. These are matters within
the common ken, and subject to so many variables and choices
that no objective standard can be supplied by an expert, if one
there be. . ... '
An analysis of New York case law reveals that the cases within
that state are in conflict as to whether the value of a mother's ser-
vices are within the common knowledge of the jury.' Moreover,
the federal courts are not in agreement on whether in a diversity
action the court should analyze state law to determine whether ex-
pert opinion is admissible on the value of a substitute mother's
services.
The Third Circuit takes the position that the question of admis-
sibility of expert opinion is evidentiary and federal law should
control. In Haddigan v. Harkins," the surviving husband testified
7 Id.
3126 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (lst Dept. 1966).
1926 App. Div. 2d at -, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871. Other courts that have held
that the value of damages resulting from the death of a mother are within the
common knowledge of a jury are: Thomas v. S. H. Pawley Lumber, 303 F.2d
604 (7th Cir. 1962) and Dobsen v. Richter, 34 Ill. App. 2d 22, 180 N.E.2d 505
(1962). However these cases did not indicate that expert testimony would be
inadmissible on the question of the value of the deceased mother's services.
4 0 Compare Zaninovich with Horton v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d
312 (Ct. Cl. 1966). In Horton, expert testimony was held admissible as to the
value of a mother's services.
41 441 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1970).
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in the trial court as to the amount of time his deceased wife had
spent cooking, sewing, and performing other household tasks. An
employment agency proprietor was called to testify to the hourly
rate paid for each of the named jobs and an amount was determin-
ed that closely represented the monetary value of decedent's serv-
ices. The Third Circuit stated in regard to the expert testimony
that although no Pennsylvania cases had been called to the court's
attention which allowed or disallowed testimony of this kind, state
law would not control on this point in any event. The court con-
cluded that this was an evidentiary question upon which federal law
controlled. ' Then, relying on Merrill," the court stated that expert
testimony of this kind was admissible in federal courts."
The Fifth Circuit takes a different approach to the question. Har-
Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills' involved an action for wrongful
death brought in federal court on behalf of the surviving children.
In the lower court, plaintiff used the testimony of an economics
professor to value the services of a hypothetical housewife. He
valued the mother's services from the time of the accident until
the youngest child left home. Defendants contended on appeal
that Georgia authority precluded the use of such testimony as an
invasion of the function of the jury. Rather than stating that the
state law did not control, as the Third Circuit did in Haddigan,
the Fifth Circuit in Har-Pen Truck Lines discussed the state cases
and distinguished them. The Fifth Circuit in justifying the use of
expert testimony stated that "the Georgia courts have expressly
sanctioned use of opinion evidence and expert testimony to eval-
uate services where that was possible."' The court relied upon
Georgia cases that had allowed testimony on the value of the serv-
ices of a substitute mother. 7
4Id. at 851.
"I Merrill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
Third Circuit also relied upon Schuler v. Berger, 275 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa.
1967) and Curnow v. West View Park Co., 220 F. Supp. 367, 373 (W.D. Pa.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 337 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1964).
44 441 F.2d at 852.
45378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
' Id. at 711. While the question was not squarely presented on appeal in
Har-Pen Truck Lines, it may be implied that the Fifth Circuit follows the view
that the propriety of expert opinion in a particular diversity case is determined by
reference to state law. This conclusion follows from their reliance on state law
in Har-Pen Truck Lines.
"7 Id. The Georgia cases relied upon were Western & A.R.R. v. Townsend, 36
There appears to be a conflict in the two circuits' approach to
the question of whether expert testimony is admissible to value
the services of a substitute-mother. While the Third Circuit in
Haddigan stated that the use of expert testimony was an evidentiary
question controlled by federal law,"8 the Fifth Circuit in Har-Pen
Truck Lines relied on state law for justifying the use of expert
testimony." Adoption of proposed federal rule 702 will clear up
confusion with respect to what standard should be followed in fed-
eral courts in admitting such testimony." If the proposed rules had
been applicable when Har-Pen Truck Lines was decided, the Fifth
Circuit would not have had to rely upon state cases to justify ad-
mission of the expert testimony. Instead, the court, relying on rule
702 which allows expert opinion if it aids the jury, and after de-
termining that the economist's testimony was helpful to the jury,
would have approved its admissibility.
One may conclude from an analysis of the above cases that
adoption of the proposed Rules will expand the use of expert testi-
mony in proof of the value of services of the substitute mother.
Rule 702 would set a definite standard for the use of expert testi-
mony. The courts will not have to rely on the relevant state's law
to justify or exclude the use of expert testimony regarding dam-
ages. Whether the federal court relies upon state law or federal
law may be very important if the applicable state law excludes
expert testimony on a certain element of damages. For example if,
in a diversity action, the federal court were to rely on New York
State law, the decision in Zaninovich " could prevent the court
from allowing expert testimony on the value of the services of a
Ga. App. 70, 135 S.E. 439 (1926) and Standard Oil Co. v. Reagan, 15 Ga.
App. 571, 84 S.E. 69 (1915).
4s441 F.2d at 851.
49378 F.2d at 711.
50 This brief discussion raises a more basic question concerning what role state
evidence rules will have in the federal courts after adoption of the proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. How compatible are the proposed Rules and the Erie
Doctrine? One scholar discussing this problem suggests that the rules governing
hearsay, authentication, best evidence, opinion testimony, impeachment of cre-
dibility, and relevancy may be classified as procedural for Erie purposes and
thus the federal rules should control over analogous state rules. The rules re-
garding expert opinion may be classified as procedural rules which should con-
trol in all federal litigation. Korn, Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence
in the Federal Courts, 48 F.R.D. 39, 73 (1969).
5'26 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dept. 1966).
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substitute mother. But if in that same diversity action the court was
guided by rule 702 the court could make a determination that the
testimony was helpful and thus admissible. Certainly under rule
702, the prospect for the increased use of expert testimony as to
valuation of a mother's services is good.
III. SUFFICIENT QUALIFICATION AS AN EXPERT
In addition to the basic requirement that the subject about
which the expert testifies must not be within the common knowl-
edge of the jury or that the testimony must be an aid to the jury
under the proposed rules, another requirement must be satisfied be-
fore one may testify as an expert. The witness must possess suf-
ficient expertise to be an aid to the jury." The expertise required
may be gained by skill, knowledge or experience. The witness
may have become qualified as an expert by reading or through
practice or a combination of both." An example of this principle
is found in Bratt v. Western Air Lines, Inc.," where a witness with
no scholastic training in aerodynamics was allowed to testify as an
expert. The witness was a man of practical experience who had
personally made a study of structural strain in aircraft. He based
his opinion upon his own knowledge and his examination of the
wreckage. The Tenth Circuit in approving the use of the testimony
stated that there is no precise requirement as to the method by
which the witness acquires the requisite amount of knowledge."'
Similarly, other cases recognize the principle that one may be
qualified as an expert from study with no actual experience."
5'2 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 30 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
See Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405 (1888); Board of Regents of the
Univ. & State College of Ariz. v. Cannon, 86 Ariz. 176, 342 P.2d 207 (1959);
Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Little, 189 Ark. 610, 74 S.W.2d 777 (1934); Kernocham
v. N.Y. Elev. R.R., 130 N.Y. 651, 29 N.E. 245 (1891).
53 See Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmer's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger,
181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943); Hyman v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 359
Mo. 1097, 225 S.W.2d 734 (1949); Bebout v. Kum, 348 Mo. 501, 154 S.W.2d
120 (1941); Bautell v. Scott's Royal Tire Co., 365 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App. 1963);
State v. Killeen, 79 N.H. 201, 107 A. 601 (1919).
"155 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 735 (1946).
Id. at 853.
"Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 62 N.E. 40 (1901); Selby v. Osage Tor-
pedo Co., 112 Okla. 303, 241 P. 130 (1925). It should be noted that other courts
require some practical experience with the particular subject in controversy.
These cases seem to hold that mere theoretical study is insufficient. See Huffman
The trial judge has broad discretion in making the factual de-
termination whether a witness is qualified as an expert, and rever-
sals for abuse of discretion are rare."' In Bratt the Tenth Circuit
stated:
'Whether a witness called to testify to any matter of opinion has
such qualifications and knowledge as to make his testimony admis-
sible, is a preliminary question for the judge presiding at the trial,
and his decision of it is conclusive unless clearly shown to be erron-
eous as a matter of law.' Stillwell Manufacturing Co. v. Phelps,
130 U.S. 520, 9 S. Ct. 601, 603, 32 L. Ed. 1035 .... ,51
Wigmore's assessment of the judge's discretion for determining
qualification as an expert is stronger:
* . .the trial court must be left to determine, absolutely and with-
out review, the fact of possession of the required qualification by a
particular witness."
While Wigmore points out that such an absolute view foreclosing
appellate review of a trial judge's determination of qualification has
not been generally accepted he does state several persuasive arg-
uments in support of his belief."
Proposed rule 702 speaks to the qualification of experts in tra-
ditional terms."' The rule requires that the experts possess "special
v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951); Fuchs v. City of St. Louis,
167 Mo. 620, 67 S.W. 610 (1902).
5 Chateougay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake, 144 U.S. 476 (1892); Spring Co.
v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1878); Sher v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
51 155 F.2d at 853.
512 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 561, at 641 (3d ed. 1940). Whether a witness
is qualified as an expert actually involves a two-part test. First it must be deter-
mined what the required level of qualification is. For example, if a witness is
a member of a profession, as a doctor, an engineer, or a chemist, the question
may be whether that witness must be a specialist in a particular branch of the
profession. Second, the trial court must determine if the particular witness has
met the required qualification. One may conclude from a study of the cases that
the distinction between the two determinations is often blurred.
40Wigmore points out that the complicated facts that may surround a witness'
competency are best understood by the trial judge. Also cross-examination is al-
ways available to examine the true qualifications of the witness. In addition,
Wigmore states that for reasons of judicial economy, the judges of the Supreme
Courts should not be required to investigate the "trifling character" of the dis-
putes that may develop over a witness' qualifications. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
561, at 642-43 (3d ed. 1940).
"Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
56 F.R.D. 282.
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knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. '"' Since this is
the same basic requirement presently applied by the courts,' the
common law requirement and the cases interpreting it may be
relied upon for support in determining whether a witness is quali-
fied as an expert under proposed rule 702. In addition, the large
degree of discretion which the common law leaves to the trial
court regarding qualifications will undoubtedly apply in the applica-
tion of proposed rule 702.
IV. PROCEDURAL EVIDENCE RULES GOVERNING
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Once it has been determined that the subject is a proper one for
expert testimony and that the witness is qualified as an expert,
the attorney must introduce the expert testimony. The actual in-
troduction of expert testimony is beset by a number of procedural
rules which have made the introduction of such testimony trouble-
some for trial attorneys, confusing to witnesses and wasteful of
time to courts. The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would per-
mit a sensible relaxation of these procedural strictures.
A. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
One topic of controversy at common law is the propriety of
asking the expert a question calling for an opinion upon an ulti-
mate issue the jury is to decide. The objection to this type of ques-
tion was usually that it "invaded the province of the jury." This
objection can be avoided by breaking down the general question
into more specific questions." The question may also be proper if
it is framed so as to inquire what the expert's opinion would be in
a similar or analogous situation. Under this guise, the jury may
imply that opinion is applicable to the present case." The rule
prohibiting opinions on ultimate facts in issue seemed to be the
rule in many states prior to 1942.0 But in 1942, there began a
2 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
63To be qualified as an expert at common law, the "witness must have a suf-
ficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling" as to be an aid
to the fact-finder. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 30 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972).
1Id. § 13, at 28.
"Ladd, Expert and Other Opinion Testimony, 40 MINN. L. REV. 437, 445
(1956).
"See, e.g., United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935); Hatch v.
trend to abandon the rule with the landmark case of Grismore v.
Consolidated Products Co.""
In Grismore, plaintiff was a turkey raiser who had been per-
suaded to buy a supposedly beneficial new type of turkey food.
After feeding the new product to his turkeys for several days, the
turkeys began to die in great numbers. At the trial an expert was
called by plaintiff and, after a hypothetical narration of the facts,
the expert was asked his opinion of the cause of death of the tur-
keys. The defendant objected to the question as an invasion of the
province of the jury. On appeal the Supreme Court of Iowa, in an
extensive opinion, concluded that the question was permissible.
Since the testimony of an expert was allowed in order to aid the
jury, the jury was entitled to the full benefit of his opinion. The
expert can never "invade the province of the jury" or "usurp the
function of the jury" because the jury is always free to reject the
expert's opinion."
Since Grismore the trend has been to allow expert opinion em-
bracing an "ultimate fact in issue."'" The proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence have specifically approved this approach in proposed
rule 704 which states:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise ad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate is-
sue to be decided by the trier of fact.
The rule applies to non-expert as well as expert witnesses. The
advisory committee points out that the new rule will not admit
opinions which would merely tell the jury who should win the
case. Rule 702 provides that the expert opinion must be an aid to
the jury and proposed rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence
United States, 34 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1929); Birmingham Stove & Range Co. v.
Vanderford, 217 Ala. 342, 116 So. 334 (1928); Irvine v. Greenway, 220 Ky.
388, 295 S.W. 445 (1927); McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930);
State v. Carr, 196 N.C. 129, 144 S.E. 698 (1928); Brown v. Schunk, 47 Ohio
App. 344, 191 N.E. 886 (1934).
:7232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
08 Id. at -, 5 N.W.2d at 656.
"' Ladd, Expert and Other Opinion Testimony, 40 MINN. L. REv. 437, 445-46
(1956); People v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944); Clifford-Jacobs
Forging Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 I11. 2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960);
Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195 (1951); Rabata v. Dohner,
172 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1969).
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if it wastes time." The committee believed that these rules would
be a sufficient safeguard against the substitution of the expert's
conclusion for the jury's verdict." As one scholar stated in regard
to the rule allowing opinion upon an ultimate issue, "[a] rule such
as that adopted by the Model Code of Evidence or by the Grismore
case simply eliminates unnecessary reversals on the imaginary er-
ror that the jury has been robbed of their power to decide."'
B. The Bases for Expert Opinion and the Hypothetical Question
The most important effect the proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence will have on expert testimony is in regard to the basis of
opinion testimony and the hypothetical question. An analysis of
this procedural area may begin with rather simple propositions.
The first proposition is that all opinions or inferences, to be prop-
erly admitted, must be founded upon certain premises of fact. The
factual premises upon which the opinion is based must be supplied
to the jury by testimony. The same expert witness may be able to
supply both the premises of fact and the inferences from these facts,
or the expert may supply either the premises or just the inferences.
If the witness supplies only the inferences or conclusions in the
form of his opinion, the factual foundation for these conclusions
must be submitted to the jury for their consideration. The jury
must consider the validity of the underlying facts in order to de-
termine the validity of the conclusion. If the jury chooses to reject
all or part of the facts, then the jury may reject the conclusion as
well. So the basic requirement emerges that the premises of fact
upon which the conclusion is based must be supplied to the jury
in some manner. This requirement has formed the rationale for
the hypothetical question in situations in which the witness has not
personally observed the facts his opinion is founded upon."
If, however, the expert witness has personal knowledge of the
10 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
,' Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 704,
56 F.R.D. 284. The committee stated that Rules 702 and 403 would exclude
opinions that were merely legal conclusions. Id. at 285.
72 Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 425 (1952).
712 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 672, at 792-93 (3d ed. 1940).
facts of the case, he may state his opinion based upon this personal
observation. It is not necessary for the attorney to ask for the ex-
pert opinion in a hypothetical form." The question need not be
stated hypothetically because, if desired, the particular facts that
are the basis of the expert opinion may be elicited on direct exam-
ination or cross examination. If the fact-finder then concludes the
factual premise to be erroneous, the opinion of the expert may be
rejected.'M Some courts, rather than allowing the factual basis to
be elicited on direct or cross examination, require the expert to
state the factual foundation for his opinion prior to stating his
opinion."0 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 705 states:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may
in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data
upon cross-examination.
While rule 705 will have an extremely important impact upon the
hypothetical question, the rule is also applicable when the expert
testifies from personal observation of the facts in the case. Rule
705 adopts the view followed by many courts that if the expert
possesses personal knowledge of the facts in the case, he need not
state his factual basis prior to giving his opinion. The rule is
phrased so that the burden is on the court to require prior dis-
closure of the factual basis for the opinion. If the judge does not
" Sherman v. City of Springfield, 77 111. App. 2d 195, 222 N.E.2d 62 (1967);
Hester v. Horton Motor Lines, 219 N.C. 743, 14 S.E.2d 794 (1941); Holecek
v. Janke, 171 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1969); Walrod v. Matthews, 210 Va. 382, 171
S.E.2d 195 (1969).
75 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE S 675, at 796 (3d ed. 1940).
70 Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U.S. 159 (1902); Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich.
501, 507 (1878); State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, 151 Mont. 300, 443 P.2d
16 (1967); Green v. Ashland Water Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77 N.W. 722 (1898).
Contra, Sanders v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 204 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1953); Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175 P.2d
823 (1946); Sherman v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 391, 250 N.E.2d
537 (1969); Independent School Dist. No. 35 v. A. Hedenberg, 214 Minn. 82,
7 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1943). See McCormick, Direct Examination of Medical
Experts in Actions for Death and Bodily Injuries, 12 LA. L. R~v. 264, 268-69
(1952).
7 See, e.g., Sanders v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 204 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1953);
Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Johns, 236 Ark. 585, 367 S.W.2d 436
(1963); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382, 74 N.E. 939, 940 (1905)
(dictum).
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require prior disclosure, factual bases may be elicted by the ad-
versary on direct or cross examination."8
If he does not possess personal or first-hand knowledge, the ex-
pert has traditionally been asked to assume certain facts and state
his opinion upon these hypothetical facts." This is to insure that
the premises of fact which form the bases of the opinion may be
considered and rejected or accepted by the fact finder." The main
problem surrounding the use of the hypothetical question involves
the form and scope of the question.
One method for using the hypothetical question is to allow the
expert witness to be present during the trial and listen to the testi-
mony presented. Then the expert when testifying may be asked in
giving his opinion to assume the truth of the testimony presented
in the case, or testimony presented for one party or one witness. 8"
The question is subject to objection if the witness is asked to assume
the truth of all the testimony in the case. The obvious reason for
the objection is that the testimony may be conflicting and the jury
may not be able to determine what testimony the expert's opinion
is based upon." This broad type of question could only be approved
if the testimony was clearly not conflicting. When the witness
is asked to assume all the testimony for one party to be true, the
question is not as objectionable.
The jury may not, however, be able to clearly determine what
one party's witnesses testified to or that party's witnesses' testimony
may be conflicting." If the expert is only asked to assume the truth
71 For similar provisions, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 1966); KAN.
CODE CIv. P. §§ 60-456, 60-457 (1964); N.J. EVID. RULES 57-58 (Supp. 1974).
71 Shapiro v. Pennsylvania R.R., 83 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Sherman v.
City of Springfield, 77 I11. App. 2d 195, 222 N.E.2d 62 (1966); Flaherty v.
Powers, 167 Mass. 61, 44 N.E. 1074 (1896); Moore v. State, 17 Ohio St. 521,
525 (1911); Weibert v. Hanan, 202 N.Y. 328, 95 N.E. 688 (1911).
802 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 672, at 792-93 (3d ed. 1940).
"C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14, at 32 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
2 0'Brien v. Wallace, 137 Colo. 253, 324 P.2d 1028 (1958); In re Barnes'
Will, 41 Del. 206, 18 A.2d 433 (1949); Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Alcock,
273 Ky. 734, 117 S.W.2d 938 (1938); Spidel v. Warrick, 83 Ohio App. 332,
78 N.E.2d 746 (1948); Wessells v. Comm'r, 164 Va. 664, 180 S.E. 419 (1935).
3 Rhea v. M.K. Grocer Co., 236 Ark. 615, 370 S.W.2d 33 (1963); Comm'r
v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 122 N.E. 176 (1919); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389,
237 N.W. 915 (1931); State v. Reilly, 25 N.D. -, 141 N.W. 733, 734 (1913),
aff'g 25 N.D. 339, 141 N.W. 720 (1913).
'4 Cases admitting the opinion in such a situation are Dunagan v. Appalachian
Power Co., 33 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1929); Comm'r v. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382,
NOTES
of one or a few witnesses' testimony, the hypothetical question may
be proper." The propriety of the question again depends upon the
clarity of the testimony in the jury's mind. If a single witness' testi-
mony was confusing to the jury or self-contradictory, a hypothetical
question based upon this testimony may be improper."8 Wigmore
suggests that it is best in these situations to allow the trial judge
in his discretion to determine the propriety of the question in view
of whether the premises of fact are clear to the tribunal. 7
If the premises of fact forming the basis for the opinion are not
clear to the fact-finder, the court may require the attorney to state
the assumed facts of the hypothetical question prior to the expert's
opinion being given. The attorney may be required to state the as-
sumed facts even if the witness was present at the trial if the testi-
mony is unclear or conflicting.8 If the expert witness was not pres-
ent at the trial and did not hear the testimony presented, it follows
logically that the fact-finder must be made aware of the premises
of fact from which the opinion is drawn. In this way the premises
of fact may be considered and if the premises are found to be faul-
ty, the opinion may be rejected.
When the assumed facts must be stated prior to the expert's opin-
ion, a practical problem emerges of how complete the description
of assumed facts should be. Must it include all the facts in the case
or just selected portions of the facts? Some courts have stated that
all the material facts in evidence should be placed in the hypo-
thetical question. This supposedly avoids the danger of a one-
sided picture of the evidence as it has been presented and insures
74 N.E. 939 (1905); State v. Eggleston, 161 Wash. 486, 297 P. 162 (1931).
A case excluding the opinion in such a situation is People v. McElvaine, 121
N.Y. 250, 24 N.E. 465 (1890).
1In re Collins, 150 Cal. App. 2d 702, 310 P.2d 663 (1957); Damm v.
State, 128 Md. 665, 97 A. 645 (1916); Baltimore City Passenger Ry. v. Tanner,
90 Md. 315, 45 A. 188 (1900); Burnside v. Everett, 186 Mass. 4, 71 N.E. 82
(1904); Contra, Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1925).
88 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 681, at 803 (3d ed. 1940). A question asking
for an opinion on a single witness' testimony will usually be held proper. Id.
5 681, at 804.
:7 Id. § 681, at 804-05.
88 Id.
89Dairymen's Milk Co. v. McCormick Co., 114 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1940);
Stumpf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Md. 696, 251 A.2d 362 (1969).
It is required that all the material facts stated in the hypothetical question must
be supported by evidence in the case. See C. MCCoRMICK, LAw OF EVIDENCE
§ 14, at 33 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
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that the jury will not ignore any evidence presented by the other
opponent. The clear disadvantage to a rule requiring all the ma-
terial facts to be stated is that the hypothetical question may be
extremely lengthy and boring to the jury. The result may be that
the jury may accept the net opinion of the expert without consider-
ing the premises of fact upon which it is based."°
The more widely prevailing view is that the hypothetical ques-
tion may contain those facts which the questioner wishes the opin-
ion to be based on. The questioner may take as limited a view as
he desires subject to certain basic policy considerations." Clearly
the question should not be one that is misleading or confusing to
the jury or one in which highly material facts are omitted. In sum
the question should contain sufficient facts for the expert to give an
intelligent opinion and one which will actually be an aid to the
jury." Necessarily the trial judge is given broad discretion in de-
termining whether a question is fairly presented considering all the
relevant evidence in the case." Leaving this determination to the
judge's discretion is preferable to attempting to state a general rule
for the scope of the hypothetical question. In addition to the fore-
going considerations, the attorney must be careful to state the ques-
tion in truly hypothetical form. If stated otherwise the jury may be
misled into believing that a certain fact is admitted or proven
when actually that fact is at issue."4
Various criticisms have been leveled at the hypothetical question.
While sound in theory, the hypothetical question in actual practice
has led to "intolerable obstruction of truth.""3 One criticism is that
because not all the material facts need be stated, " clever counsel
can shape the question so as to produce a partisan conclusion not
902 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 682, at 805-06 (3d ed. 1940).
11 Barnes v. Omark Indus., Inc., 396 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1966); Napier v. Green-
zweig, 256 F. 196 (2d Cir. 1919); Swenson v. Bender, 114 F. 1 (9th Cir. 1902);
Alward v. Paola, 79 Cal. App. 2d 1, 179 P.2d 5 (1947); Donch v. Kardos, 149
Conn. 196, 177 A.2d 801 (1962); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stanley,
215 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
112 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 682, at 807-09 (Supp. 1972).
9
"Id. § 682, at 810; Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.
1960). In addition to the safeguard provided through the discretionary power of
the judge, the adversary may always elicit any omitted facts on cross-examina-
tion. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14, at 34 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
4 State v. Wangberg, 272 Minn. 204, 136 N.W.2d 853, 855 (1965).
12 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 686, at 812 (3d ed. 1940).
"° See cases cited note 91 supra.
representing the expert's actual opinion. In the courts that do re-
quire all the material facts to be stated, the question is exceedingly
lengthy and boring to the jury. Thus the question may tend only to
bias, confuse or bore the jury."
The solution to the problems of the hypothetical question and
other procedural requirements is found in the more realistic and
practical approach used by the proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The rules do not forbid the use of the hypothetical question
but rather give the questioner the option of using the hypothetical
form or a more direct question. The trial judge in his discretion
may require the question to be in hypothetical form. Regardless of
the form of the question, the cross-examiner is free to bring out
the factual basis of the expert's opinion." Proposed rule 705 (which
determines whether the factual basis must be stated prior to giving
the opinion) should be read in conjunction with proposed rule 703,
which states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or in-
ferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence. (emphasis added).
The rule allows the data forming the basis for an opinion to come
from three sources. The facts may be acquired by personal obser-
vation as is allowed at common law." Secondly, the facts may be
presented to the expert at trial by the use of the hypothetical ques-
tion in which case every fact relied upon must be in evidence or
by having the expert present throughout the trial to hear the evi-
dence submitted. The third source of facts for the expert's opinion
is from data presented to the expert outside of court that he has
97See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940); C. MCCORMICK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 16 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
"Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
his reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may
in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data
on cross-examination.
It should be noted that this rule does not abolish the hypothetical question but
rather gives the questioning attorney the option of not using the hypothetical
form.
' Cases cited note 74 supra.
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not personally observed. This third source is the one that differs
substantially from the common law approach taken by many courts.
The majority of jurisdictions have held that opinions are inadmis-
sible if based upon opinions or report of others that are not in evi-
dence or that are inadmissible under the hearsay rule.'
Rule 703 abolishes this common law requirement and allows
the opinion to be based upon the reports of others. The data must
be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts normally.1"' A good
example is the medical doctor who reasonably relies upon the re-
ports of nurses, technicians, other doctors and hospital records.
Cross examination provides another safeguard by allowing the op-
ponent to elicit the fact that the expert did not personally test or
observe the data upon which he relies. While the medical reports of
the nurses, technicians, or doctors upon which the expert witness
relies could be introduced in evidence, Rule 703 allows the attorney
to ask the expert's opinion directly without the expense and time
that would be expended in introducing the reports."°2 In aviation ac-
cident litigation, the expert witness may state his opinion upon ac-
cident reports not in evidence if the reports are reasonably reliable.
This could result in a considerable saving of time and expense.
In combination, proposed rule 703 and rule 705 provide a sim-
plified and practical method of examining the expert witness.
Rule 705 will allow attorneys the option of using the hypothetical
question subject to the discretion of the trial court. This will help
to alleviate partisan conclusions by experts and to alleviate the
boredom of the jurors occasioned by the use of lengthy and often
confusing hypothetical questions. Rule 703, by allowing opinions
based upon reports of others, expands the basis of expert opinion in
order that the jury may be more fully benefited by the expert's su-
perior knowledge. Sufficient safeguards against abuse surround
100 Taylor v. B. Heller & Co., 364 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1966); Dulansky v.
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 10 F.R.D. 566 (D.C. Iowa 1950); Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Kazee, 257 Ky. 803, 79 S.W.2d 208 (1935);
Sykes v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 200 Va. 559, 106 S.E.2d 746 (1959).
101 The Advisory Committee noted that the rule would not allow opinions of
"an 'accidentologist' as to the point of impact in an automobile collision case
based on statements of bystanders, since the requirement of reliance is not satis-
fied." 56 F.R.D. 284. The comment would seem to indicate that the court is
not required to accept the expert's statement that the data is reasonably reliable
in the particular field if the court believes the data to be unreliable.
102 Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 703,
56 F.R.D. 283.
both rules, and the net result should be that experts are used more
fully, more efficiently and for the greater benefit of the jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of the expert witness in air crash litigation
makes it imperative to have an understanding of the common law
rules and the proposed federal rules regarding expert opinion. The
common law has approved the use of the expert in aviation accident
reconstruction. Although proposed rule 702 is a more liberal pro-
vision for allowing expert opinion, the use of experts as an aid in
determining liability will probably not be significantly affected be-
cause the common law recognizes that the cause of an air crash is
not within common knowledge of the jury. The expert's role in
helping to assess damages is also important in an air crash case.
The adoption of the proposed rules will establish a definite stand-
ard for admissibility of expert testimony. Because new rule 702 re-
quires only that the testimony be an aid to the jury, experts may be
used more frequently in assessing damages, especially in the sub-
stitute housewife area. State rules regarding admissibility of the
expert's opinion on the value of the deceased housewife's services
will not control and the frequency of this type of testimony may in-
crease.
Of greatest importance to the aviation litigation attorney are
rules 703 and 705. The many problems that surrounded the use of
the hypothetical question and other common law procedural re-
quirements will be alleviated by adoption of the new federal rules.
The attorney will no longer be required to propound lengthy and
boring hypothetical questions. No longer will there be disputes on
the length and content of the hypothetical question. Rather the
expert will be allowed to state his opinion directly and more effec-
tively. This will give a clearer picture to the jury of the expert's
true opinion. The rules provide adequate safeguards to insure that
the expert's opinion is well founded. The other very significant de-
parture from common law allows the opinion of the expert to be
based upon the reliable reports of others which need not be admis-
sible in evidence. Thus rule 703 provides an efficient and econom-
ical means of presenting the expert's opinion to the jury. The rules
will solve many of the complicated procedural problems judges and
attorneys have faced in the aviation accident case. While provid-
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ing adequate procedural safeguards, the new rules allow the ex-
pert's opinion to be presented more efficiently and for the greater
benefit of all the participants in the aviation accident suit. The
adoption of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence regarding ex-
pert opinion will be welcomed by aviation attorneys and trial
judges as providing a more practical and efficient framework for
the presentation of an expert's opinion."3
Paul W. Gertz
.
0 The approach of the proposed rules regarding expert opinion has been
adopted by the courts of Wisconsin. Rabata v. Dohner, 172 N.W.2d 409 (Wis.
1969). Other state courts will undoubtedly be influenced by the federal rules.
